How trade and macroeconomic policies affect economic growth and capital accumulation in developing countries by Lopez, Ramon
Policy,  Research,  and  External  Affairs
WORKING PAPERS
Trade  Policy
Country  Economics  Department




and  Macroeconomic  Policies
Affect  Economic  Growth
and  Capital  Accumulation
in Developing  Countries
Ramon  Lopez
A stable exchange rate is crucial to economic growth.  Export
promotion generates faster growth than import liberalization.
Economic instability and foreign debt are key determinants of
capital growth.
'llic  I'olicy, Rcscarch,  and  IExtemal  Affairs Complcx  d:stribltes  PRI Working  Papcrs  to disscminatr  thc findings  or work  ui progrcss  and
to encourage  the  cxchange  of idcas  amonig  Bank  staff and  all others  interested  in developnent  issucs.  Iicsc  papers  carry  thc  names  of
the authoni,  rifleci  onlv their  vicws, anid  should  he used  and  cited accordtngly  1'hc findings, interpretations,  and  conclusions  arc thc
















































































































dPolicy,  Research,  and External  Affairs
I  - it  -rl 
Trade  Policy
WPS 625
This paper  -a  product of the Trade Policy Division, Country Economics Department  -is  part of a
research effort in PRE, Trade Reform and SustainabiFty (RPO 675-32). Copies are available ICre  from  tlhc
World Bank, 1818 H Street NW, Washington DC 20433.  Please contact Karla Cabana, room N 10-035,
extension 37946 (30 pages).
Lopez provides cross-country empirical evidencc  exchange rates for extended periods, leading to
on the relationship between trade and macroeco-  periodic balance of paymenits  crises anid  a hiighily
nomic policy and economic growth.  He finds  unstablc real exchange rate.
that:
Export promotion policies generate faster
Countries that follow sustainable strategies  growth than policies that remove import restric-
perfonn better than those following  tions.
unsustainable strateg.  . Indeed, unsustainable
policies hurt growth.  Sustainable policies (as in  *  Economic instability and foreign debt are
Korea, Taiwan, Singapore, Hong Kong, Thai-  key determinants of capital growth.
land, and Malaysia) promote exports and lead to
real exchange rates that are either fully aligned  *  Contrary to conventional belief, capital
or even undervalued for prolonged periods of  accumulation appears to be stimulated by direct
time but arc relatively stable.  Unsustainable  export restrictions and does not seem to be
policies (more common in developing countries)  directly  affected by economic instability.
include policies that tax exports and overvalue
Thc  PRE Working Papcr Scrics disseminates dte findings of work under way in the Bank's Policy. Rcsearchi,  and External
AffairsComplcx. An objectiveof thcserics is to get thesc findings out quickly, even if'presentations  are lcss  thlan  fully lx)lished.
Thc findings, interpretations, and conclusions in thcsc papers do not necessarily represent official B1ank  policy.
I'roduccd by the IPRE  Dissemination CcnterTable of Contents
Page#
1.  Introduction  I
11.  Trade Strategies: Some Further Taxonomy  5
Ill.  Methodology  and Estimation  10
IV.  Data and Results  14
V.  A Suggested  Interpretation  of the Results  18
VI.  Summary  and Conclusions  20
Appendix  30
This paper has benefitted  from the comments  by Jim de Melo, Arvind  Panagariya, Paul Romer,
Dani Rodrik, Maurice Schiff, Vinod Thomas, and Jim Tybout on an earlier draft.  Able research
assistance  was provided  by Bjorn Larsen. Financial  support was provided  by the World Bank Research
Committee, RPO #675-32.I
ECONOMIC  GROWTH,  CAPITAL  ACCUMULATION
AND THE TRADE/MACRO  POLICY  REGIME  IN LDCs
I.  Introduction
The relation  between  trade strategy  and economic  growth  has received  increasing  attention  during
the last decade.  The neoclassical  growth model suggests  that under the usual constant returns to scale
production  function  without externalities,  per capita economic  growth along the optimal  path basically
depends  on the rate of (per capita)  capital  accumulation  and technological  change. In steady state  growth
in per capita income  is entirely  determined  by the rate of productivity  growth. Since static (efficiency)
gains of removing  even  relatively  large distortions  have  been  shown  to be modest,  economists  have  turned
to endogenous  dynamic  effects  of outward-oriented  trade  policies  on productivity  growth  and externalities
(Lucas 1988, Romer 1986, and Edwards 1989).
The limited empirical evidence  available to-date suggests  that the trade/macro policy strategy
chosen by a country plays a more important role in economic  growth than what is suggested  by the
simplest  versions of the neoclassical  rrowth model. Perhaps the most compelling  evidence  supporting
the hypothesis  that trade policies  affect economic  growth comes from the few developing  cot ntries that
during the last 2  decades have made significant progress to  achieve the standards of  living of
industrialized  economies. These countries  (Korea, Taiwan, Singapore,  Hong Kong, and more recently,
Thailand and Malaysia), whether following a "liberal equivalent"  trade strategy as Krueger (1978),
Bhagwati  (1978)  and others suggest  or an active  government  intervention  strategy  as suggested  by Sachs
(1987), have a common  trade/macro  policy denominator  that largely  distinguishes  them from most other
developing countries.  The policy similarity has been their massive  export promotion including  both
commercial  and exchange  rate policies  that led to real exchange  rates  that have  been either fully "aligned"
or even  undervalued  for prolonged  periods of time. Moreover,  largely  because  of the trade/macro  policy2
regime  followed  the real exchange  rate has shown  a relatively  high degree  of stability. This is in contrast
with the experience  of the vast majority  of the rest of the developing  world where commercial  policies
have usually  taxed exports and maintained  their real exchange  rate overvalued  for periods of time, which
in turn have forced periodic balance of payments crises and a high degree of instability  of the real
exchange  rate.
The above evidence is, of course, only suggestive. It is possible that these particular policy
differentials  make no real difference  and that the apparent correlation  between policy and growth have
no causal implications. Nonetheless,  there exists some further evidence  obtained by detailed, usually
multicountry  studies, which despite  their many  limitations  still point  towards  some degree  of a systematic
relationship  between  trade policy  orientation  and growth.'
Several studies have been directed to either endogenize  productivity growth by making it
dependent  on the trade regime, or to remove the assumption  of constant  returns to scale thus allowing
for internal  or external economies  of scale.  Two other mechanisms  by which trade/macro policies  can
affect growth at least in the intermediate  run, which have received  little attention  are the following: (i)
the effect of economic  instability  (in particular  exchange  rate instability)  on productivity  growth that ex-
ante unsustainable  trade/macro policies may generate, and (ii) the effects of these policies on capital
accumulation. Unsustainable  strategies  are those that follow a combination  of macro and trade policies
that are not consistent  with external  (current  account)  equilibrium. Ex-ante unsustainable  strategies  lead
to economic  instability  characterized  by periodical  balance  of payment  crises that force major  adjustments
of the exchange  rate and domestic expenditures. Once the crisis is ov-r the policy mix becomes  again
biased  by taxing exportables  and importables. This, in turn, causes more external  disequilibria  which
after a while require a new round  of devaluation  and expenditure  adjustment. Although  both sustainable
and unsustainable  strategies  are characterized  by external  equilibrium  on average over a long period  of
I  See Edwards (1989) for a critical review  of the empirical  studies available.3
time, the main distinction  between  the two is that a sustainable  strategy, ceteris paribus, will provide  a
more stable real exchange  rate/current  account  profile than an unsustainable  strategy. The key issue is,
therefore, the effect of economic instability  on growth.  If instability  is detrimental  for growth then
trade/macro  policies that are ex-ante  unsustainable  will retard economic  growth.
The fact that the effect of trade/macro policies on growth via capital  accumulation  has been
largely ignored  at least in cross country  analyses  is quite surprising. This is so because  empirical  work
has shown that, while productivity  growth is the most important  factor explaining  growth, the role of
capital  expansion  is far from being negligible. Moreover, it appears  tha: capital accumulation  in LDCs
plays ar even greater role in explaining  economic  growth than in developed  countries.
The endogenous  productivity  growth version that is perhaps most relevant to LDCs emphasizes
the role of the trade regime in determining  how fast existing innovations  are absorbed by a particular
country (Lewis, 1955, Edwards, 1989). A number  of authors have documented  a strong and positive
association between growth in exports -- a measure of greater outward-orientation  -- and growth in
output. Based on the experience  of eleven economies  during 1960-73,  Balassa  (1982) concluded  tl Jt a
high rate of export growth  has positive  effects  on output  growth. A growing number  of empirical  studiew
bring out the significance  of exrort growth to output performance  (Kavoussi, 1984 and Ram, 1985).
Grounds  for considering  eAports  as an additional  factor of production  and as a source of growth include
their technological  diffusion  effects,  associated  scale  economies,  and positive  externalities  stemming  from
the exposure  to larger markets and greater competition.
Two limitations of the observed export-GDP  linkage are particularly noteworthy.  First, the
standard regression results do not permit the establishment  of causality  from export growth to output
growth, as is often asserted. 2 Second, the studies are seldom able to control for the actual  trade policy
bias of the countries.  Thus,  even where the contribution  of  exports and outward orientation is
2  Jung and Marshall  (1985) found in most cases a two-way  causality.4
established,  this by itself  provides  only indirect  evidence  in favor of export-oriented  policies  but says little
about t,ue  most effective  policies  to promote exports. 3
The purpose of this paper is to provide some further cross-country  empirical evidence  on the
relationship between trade/macro policy strategies and economic growth.  Following the growth
accounting  tradition, we use an extended  GDP function  where  we consider  trade/macro  policy, Adicators
in  addition to  the conventional factors of  production.  We consider two channels bv  which the
trade/macro  policy environment  may affect  growth, namely, its direct effects  on productivity  growth and
its indirect  effects via capital accumulation.
An important  difference  with previous  studies  is that we use a much  broader taxonomy  of policy
strategies. Most analyses  have been  in the past implicitly  or sometimt  3  explicitly  based on the traditional
taxonomy proposed by  Bhagwati  that focusses on trade policies only.  This taxonomy suggests a
dichotomous  policy alternative,  namely, import substitution  or export promotion. We propose here a
taxonomy  that allows for various combinations  of trade and macro/expenditure  policies.  This permits
us to distinguish  not oniy between import substitution and export criented strategies  but also between
ex-ante sustainable and unsustainable  trade/macro policy strategies as defined above.  We consider
disaggregated  trade policy indicators combined w!i+'  measures of real exchange rate instability  and
alternatively  current  account  instability,  which  allow  us to distinguish  export  oriented, import  substitution,
ex-ante sustainable and unsustainable  trade/macro policy strategies.  The fact that we relate growth
directly to trade policies  rather than to exports  or other trade flow variables  has the advantage  of partially
mitigating  the causality  issue (policies  are more likely to be exogenous  than trade flows)  so pervasive  in
cross-country  studies that have tried to explain  growth by export  growth and other trade flow variables.
In contrast  with recent empirical  analyses  we explicitly  allow  for the joint determination  of output
growth and capital  growth as mutually  interdependent  variables. This enables us to obtain estimates  of
3  An important  exception  is Balassa  (1985)  who does relate economic  growth  to various policies.5
the two channels by which trade/macro policies can affect growth, namely, productivity  changes and
capital accumulation.
A third contribution of this paper is to  provide so. -e evidence on the factors underlying
differences in capital growth across countries, using both trade regime variables, measures of price
instability  and national  debt as  explanatory  variables. In various internal  World Bank  documents  it has
been suggested  that a more  open trade policy  leads  to greater capital growth. On the other hand, Rodrik
(1988) argues that the trade regime is of little importance  in determining  investments  and that the key
factor required to promote domestic investments  in LDCs is a reduction in uncertainty.  Using trade
regime proxies as well as simple measures of instability we provide some empirical verification of
Rodrik's claims.
The remainder  of this paper is organized  as follows: In Section  II we briefly review  the accepted
taxonomy  of trade policies due to Krueger  (1978) and Bhagwati  (1988)  arguing  that a broader  taxonomy
explicitly accounting  for non-tradables  is necessary.  Section III is devoted to a description of the
methodology  and estimation  strategy. In Section  IV we provide  the main  results, in Section  V we provide
a tentative  interpretation  of the results, and in the last section  we summarize  the major findings.
II.  Trade Strategies: Some Further Taxonorqy
Traditionally trade policies are classified into import substitution szrategies where import
substitutes  enjoy  greater incentives  than exports, and export  promotion  strategies  where the export  sector
receives  as much  incentives  as import  substitution  industries  (Bhagwati  adds an "ultra export  promotion"
strategy where exports receive  more incentives  than import substitutes). This taxonomy  only considers
relative incentives  to importables  and exportables  ignoring  any effect of trade and macro policies  on the
non-tradable  sector.  This requires  the assumption  of permanent  current account equilibrium,  in which6
case the price of non-tradables  is uniquely  determined  by the prices of the importable  and exportable
goods. If because  of expansive  fiscal/monetary  policies  or other  reasons  the price of non-tradables  is too
high relative to that of tradables, a temporary  current account  deficit is generated  that, in turn, triggers
automatic  expenditure  reducing  mechanisms  correcting  the imbalance  and the exchange  rate overvaluation.
The government  can ot couirse  neutralize  these  effects  by appropriate  expenditure  measures  but to the cost
of rapidly  depleting  foreign  exchange  reserves  and/or increasing  international  debt. Thus the government
can maintain overvaluation  only to  the extent permitted by the availability of foreign reserves and
international  creditworthiness.  Beyond this the only possible outcome is to  allow for the market
mechanisms  to operate reestablishing  an equilibrium  exchange  rate meaning  that in the long-run there is
no room for a "non-tradable  promotion"  strategy.
Although  the above argument  clearly  indicates  that the limits for exchange  rate overvaluation  ate
quite narrow, what is not so clear is that the argument  is completely  symmetric. Undervaluation  of the
real  exchange rate  seems much miure sustainable than  overvaluation.  A  government can use
fiscal/monetary  instruments  to neutralize  the effect of the current account surpluses  caused  by exchange
rate undervaluation  for much longer  periods  of time. The consequence  of this would be a continuous  and
persistent  accumulation  of foreign  reserves and foreign  assets.  It appears  that the only limit to this lies
in the effectiveness  cf the neutralization  mechanisms  used by the government  which may tend to decline
as foreign assets  continue  to accumulate. The fact that a policy  of systematic  undervaluation  may not be
optimal  does not mean that it should not be considered  as a feasible  strategy  at least for the intermediate
run.  The experiences  of Japan and specially  Taiwan provide 'real  world' examples  of persistent and
increasing current account surpluses that have gone unchecked  for decades.  The key issue is that
macro/trade  policy biases against  non-tradables  can be sustained  for suffici  Xntly long periods of time to
cause dramatic changes  in the pattern of development.7
Once we allow for the price of non-tradables  to be part of the trade/macro  policy strategy we
need to distinguish  those that are a priori sustainable  from those that are not.  Sustainable  strategies  are
those policy combinations  that ex-ante imply either a balanced or surplus .urrent account. 4 These
strategies  are sustainable  in the sense that they can be maintained  for a long period  of time without  going
through major instability  in relative prices, particularly  the real exchange  rate.  Ex-ante  unsustainable
strategies  generate  periodic deficits in the current account  that require major (temporary)  corrections  in
the real exchange rate once a balance  of payments  crisis becomes  serious.  After the crisis is over the
policy  mix  is  again  biased  toward  external  deficits  which  after  a  while  require  drastic
expenditure/devaluation  corrections  and so on.  The main characteristic  of unsustainable  strategies  is to
cause chronic economic  instability,  particularly  reflected  in large fluctuations  of the real exchange  rate.
Table 1 proposes a taxonomy  of six trade/macro policy strategies consistent  with the previous
discussion. Direct export  promotion  policies  include  export  subsidies,  drawbacks,  preferential  credit and
other measures that favor the export sector directly.  Direct import protection essentially covers
quantitative  restrictions,  import  tariffs and any other restrictions  to imports  that lend  domestic  production
of import substitutes  more profitable. Implicit  in Table 1 are the indirect  or general equilibrium  effects
of trade/macro  policies which act through the price of non-tradables  (or, equivalently,  through wages).
In the anti-non-tradable  strategy the non-tradable  sector is not compensated  for the direct export
promotion  and import restriction  measures. That is, the real exchange  rate is undervalued  or the wage
rate is too low causing a current account surplus.  Since this is quite sustainable  there is no need of
frequent adjustments and thus the system is inherently stable.  This is translated in a  low rate of
variability of the real exchange  rate.  Strategies  2 and 3 concentrate  the direct incentives  on either the
Of course the current account  needs to be in equilibrium  over the very long-run. The question
is whether  this equilibration  process is achieved  in a stable framework  or require  periodic major
adjustments. The former occurs when the policy mix is ex-ante consistent  with current account
equilibrium  or surplus.8
impori substitution  or export sector and may or may not compensate  the non-tradable  sector.  The
important  thing is that the net a-priori effect of these strategies is either to penalize  or have a neutral
effect on the non-tradable  sector. As a consequence,  the current account will be either ii surplus  or in
equilibrium  and thus the strategy  does not require  large periodic adjustments  of the real exchange  rate.
The last 3 strategies generate ex-ante curren. account deficits which implies the necessity  of
constant real exchange rate corrections with the government  persih.  ng in its unsuccessful  efforts to
maintain  the real price of non-tradables  and wages  too high. The net or  average long-run  effect of this
is not of course a  permanent overvaluation  of the real exchange rate but rather a  large degree of
variability of the real exchange rate.  Also, the current account is characterized  by a high degree of
instability  with periods of deficits followed  by surpluses (this is reflected in the (-/+)  sign under the
current account  column for rows 4 to 6).
It appears  that the most common  strategies  adopted  by LDCs  fall among  the first four categories
in Table 1.  The fast growing South East Asian countries have implemented  strategies that can be
probarAy  best characterized  by 3 or perhaps 1 while most Latin American  economic  policies are better
described  by 4.
The taxonomy  proposed above  has three important  implications: (i) the trade policy  orientation
cannot be judged separately  from macroeconomic  policies, particularly  those affecting  the determination
of the real exchange  rate; (ii) the degree of instability  of the current account  balances  and real exchange
rate provide  an important  indicator  to distinguish  between  ex-ante  sustainable  and unsustainable  strategies;
(iii) trade/exchange  rate policies can determine  real export incentives  and import substitution  incentives
more or less independently  at least in the int.nmediate  run.  That is, in contrast with the conventional
presumption,  there is no reason why the effects  of increasing  direct export  incentives  on GDP should  be
identical  to reducing  import  substitution  incentives. The Lerner symmetry  condition  does not hold except9
in the very long-run.'  This has ir..portant implications  for the empirical analysis of this paper.  In
particular, this is a justification to use direct export incentives  and import substitution  incentives as
independent  explanatory  variables in the GDP growth and capital growth equations. Moreover, if the
ex-ante  trade/macro  strategies  chosen  by countries  are important  for growth,  the above  taxonomy  suggest
that, in addition to the conventional  variables (capital growth, employment  growth, etz.), either real
exchange  rate or current account instability,  should also be used as a factor determining  growth.
This framework  permits us to provide some evidence  on the effectiveness  of export incentives
vis-a-vis import substitution  incentives in promoting growth and capital accumulation  to answer the
following important  question:  Is reducing import barriers equally eftective as export promotion in
generating  economic  growtni?  Within the conventional  framework  the answer would  be affirmative  since
both imply  the same thing, namely a reduction in the anti export  bias.  If the taxonomy  suggested  here
is at all relevant, the answer to the above question  would be negative. Reducing  import barriers will
imply resource flows towards the non-tradable  sector as well as to the export sector from the ir. Sort
substitution  sector while increasing  export promotion  will cause resources  to flow from both the import
substitution  and non-tradables  towards the export  sector. If exports are (gross) substitutes  in production
with both non-tradables  and import substitutes,  it can be shown  that the effect on the export  sector of an
increase in direct export promotion  will be greater than that of a similar reduction in import  barriers.
Even without  non-tradables,  and assuming  sustainable  external  equilibrium  Razin and Svensson
(1983) have shown that the Lerner symmetry  condition does not hold in multiperiod  models
except in the steady state.  In general, the very fact that exchange rate devaluation  (an equal
incentive  to both importables  and exportables)  has real effects  suggests  that the Lerner symmetry
condition  does not hold.10
li1. Methodology  and Estimation
We consi, r the rates of growth of output and capital as simultaneously  determined. First we
specify the GDP growth equation and next we consider the capital growth equation.  Define a GDP
function  in the standard manner,
(1)  Y = F(K,  L,  Z; A)  - qZ,
where Y is GDP level, K is the stock of physical capital, L  is labor, Z  is the level of imported
intermediate  inputs, A is an index  of productivity,  and q is the real price of imported  intermediate  inputs.
Since  we are interested  in cross country  analysis  we can assume  that q is approximately  similar
across countries  and thus define the GDP function  exclusively  in terms of the factors  of production
(2)  Y = G(K,  L, Z; A),
where the effect of Z'  on GDP is zero if GDP is measured  in domestic  rather than in world prices as is
the case with conventional  statistics. Therefore, one can write a per capita GDP growth equation  as
(3)  g = a* k  +  coL L + ct A
where y is per capita GDP growth, k is the rate of growth of the capital stock per capita, A is rate of
productivity  growth, and ak,  OIL, and  ,A  are fixed  coefficients. Note that aL = 0 implies  constant  returns
to scale. We postulate  that the rate of growth  of productivity  depends  on the trade/macro  policy regime.
The more open the trade regime is the more rapid the adoption  of new technologies  is likely to be and,
hence, export and import restrictions  are 1  kely to reduce growth.
As discussed in the previous section, sustainable  ex-ante  trade/macro policy regimes are likely
to generate a more stable economic  environment  than unsustainable  regimes.  This can affect growth11
through various mechanisms. The more stable  an economy  is the greater will be the allocation  of capital
to research activities vis-a-vis physical capital and the fastest can technological  change be developed
and/or adapted to the specific country conditions. That is, stability affects the composition  of capital
accumulation  between physical  capital and research and development. It is assumed  that investments  in
research  and development  require  a much  longer  maturity  period  than physical  capital  and are also riskier
than non-research investments.  This implies that an adequate level of  investment  in research and
development  requires  greater stability.
Thus, the growth in productivity  can be represented  by,
(4)  A  - =  +  DxDX  + #DwDM  +  ao,
where DX is a measure of direct export  restrictions,  DM is a measure  of direct import  restrictions, and
a is a variable reflecting economic  instability. According  to the previous discussion  the expected  signs
of the coefficients  are ODX  C  0,  #DM  <  0 and  e  <  0.  The coefficient  IDM  <  0  if import restrictions
imply also difficulties  in absorbing  external  technical  change  that is embodied  in imported  goods  and #DX
<  0  if expanding exports provide, for example, additional incentives for the adoption of modern
techniques  that usually require large plant capacity  (and, hence, international  markets)  to be profitable.
Substituting  (4) in (3) we obtain the estimating  growth equation,
(5)  9=c aO  + cvkk  +  caLt  + aDXDX  + aDMDM +  cta  ,
where aO  - aOaA;  aDX  - #Dx  cA;  %DA - Du^;  ae  - ctA
Most empirical studies do not use capital growth as an explanatory  variable mainly due to
problems  in measuring the stock of capital required to calculate  the rate of growth.  They instead use
investment/GDP  (see, for example, Edwards, 1989).  When the investment/GDP  ratio is used the
interpretation  of the coefficient is not the share of capital but is rather the marginal  physical  product of12
capital. Since in a cross-country  analysis  this coefficient  is assumed  constant  across countries  it can be
easily  shown that this is equivalent  (under  constant  returns  to scale)  to assume  that the capital/labor  ratios
are constant across countries which is certainly more unrealistic than assuming that the shares are
constant.6
An alternative  approach  actually  followed  in this study is to consider  a unique  (average)  rate of
growth of c,pital throughout  the period (and country)  that would replicate  the actual growth of capital
as closely as possible. Assume,  for example,  that the path of capital can be approximated  by
(6)  K,=  Ko (1 +  k)'
where Ko  is the stock of capital at the beginning  of the period under consideration  and k, is the average
(equivalent)  growth rate of capital for the period. Differentiating  (6) with respect to time  and using 1,
= AK,  +  4 we obtain,
(7)  1,  [6  + In (I  +&k)] Ko (I  + k)'
and taking log of both sides,
(8)  In  1,  yo +  yj t
where  y 0 - [a + In ( I + k,)] Ko
y,  I  in (I  +4X)
Thus by estimating  (8), which only requires  data on gross investments,  it is possible  to obtain an
estimate  of the average growth rate of capital without  necessitating  information  on the stock of capital,
k,  =  antiln Ty - 1.  Equation (8) is estimated  for each country  using time series for the period under
consideration,  and the average growth rate of capital is derived from the estimated  coefficient  y, using
its definition. To obtain the capital growth per capita, k, as required by (5) we simply use k =  lk,-L.
6  On the other hand, the use of this procedure in time series analysis  requires that the system be
in steady  state at all times!13
The (per capita)  growth  of physical  capital is assumed  to be determined  by the (per capita)  GDP
growth rate, the degree of economic  stability  prevailing  in each country  considered  during the period  of
analysis, the level of external debt of the country and by features of the trade regime.  Naturally we
expect that the effect of the GDP growth rate on capital  growth to be positive  as suggested  by the various
versions of the theory of the accelerator. Consistent  with the idea that there exist important  entry and
exit costs associated  with investments  one would expect that even if decision makers are risk neutral
increased  uncertainty  will decrease  the level of investment  (Rodrik, 1988). Therefore,  greater instability
and, hence, greater uncertainty  is likely to have a negative  effect on investments  and consequently  on
capital growth.
The effect of external debt on "apital growth is also expected  to be negative  at least for two
reasons.  One is the debtor hangover  story in which the existence  of a heavy debt burden reduces the
incentives  to invest  due to the fact that debt payments  are tied to economic  performance. Another  reason
is that heavily indebted  countries  are forced  to reduce  their external  imbalances  which, in turn, calls for
large reductions of  fiscal expenditures.  It  is usually the public investment component of  fiscal
expenditures  that suffers the largest  reduction in this situation. Since public investment  is an important
component of total investment, its reduction usually implies a significant  deceleration  of the rate of
growth of total capital. The degree of export  and import  restrictions, may have an ambiguous  effect on
capital accumulation.  If domestic production of importables  is more capital intensive than that of
exportables  and non-tradables,  it is possible that greater import restrictions have a positive effect on
capital accumulation.
Thus, the specification  of the cross-country  analysis  of capital  accumulation  is the following:
(9)  k = eo + ey  y  +  e  or + eD-  I  [DI  + EDXDX+  eDM,14
where D is the stock of debt.  Consistent  with the previous discussion  the following  sign pattern is
expected  for the coefficients: ey >  O,  Eo < O, eD  <  0, eDX,  EDM >  °.
IV.  Data and Results
The per capita GDP growth equation (5) and the per capita capital growth equation (9) were
estimated  using cross-country  data for a set of  35 developing  countries  using a Two Stage Least square
method.'  The period under analysis is  1975-85.  The data on the trade regime is based on the
assessment  of various components  of trade policies  prepared in a cross-country  study by Halevi (1989).
The trade regime data collected by Halevi corresponds mostly to the period 1979-83.  Since some
countries in the sample have in part altered their trade regimes throughout  the 1975-85  period, we also
estimate  the model for the period 1979-83  to check the robustness  of the estimates.
The indicator  of instability  (variable  a) chosen was the real exchange  rate variability  defined as
the coefficient  of variability  (standard  deviation/mean)  of the real exchange  rate during the period  under
analysis. 8 The variable  representing  export restrictions  (DX) is a dummy  variable  that equals to one for
countries that, according  to Halevi's analysis,  have imposed  a high degree of direct export restrictions.
Similarly, import restrictions  are represented  by a dummy  variable  (DM) that equals  to one for countries
that exhibit a high degree of direct import protection. We note that, consistent  with the taxonomy  of
trade regimes proposed in Section II, we are considering  here only direct restrictions.  That is, for
example,  a country  is judged  to have  high export restrictions  based only on direct disincentives  to exports
without  considering  indirect  incentives  such as the degree of protection  to the import substitution  sector.
7  See appendix  for the lists of countries  considered.
8  We measure the deviations  from the fitted trend values  of the real exchange  rate.15
Tables 2 and 3 present  the  two stage Least  square estimates  of the model  using samples  that cover
two periods, namely, 1975-85  and 1979-83. The reason for estimating  the 1979-83  period was that the
trade regime data covers this period and thus we were interested in checking the stability of the
parameters  estimated  using the longer  time period. The estimates  in Tables 2 and 3 were obtained after
excluding  3 and 2 observations,  respectively  that turned out significant  at 5% level of significance  when
performing  the D exclusion  text for influential  observations  (Besley,  Kuh and Welsh, 1980).9
In general, the goodness-of-fit  of the two set of estimates  is very good with adjusted  R 2 in the
0.42-0.62 range and high level of significance  of most variables considered. The sign pattern of the
coefficients  is generally  consistent  with a priori expectations  with the only exception  of the sign of the
coefficient  of the export dummy in the capital growth equation. Moreover, as shown by the equations
presented in Tables 2 and 3 as well as several  other estimates  not reported in them, the coefficients  are
quite robust to changes  in data and specification. The lack of significance  of the coefficient  associated
with the labor force variable in the per capita GDP growth equations  suggests  that the hypothesis  of
constant  returns to scale cannot be rejected.
We use a Chow test to analyze  the stability of the coefficients  through time.  In particular we
tested whether they remained  constant in the period 1981-85  compared  with the 1975-80  period.  The
hypothesis  of stability  of the coefficients  could  not be rejected  at 5% level  of significance. Similarly,  the
hypothesis  that the coefficients  were constant  in the period 1979-83  could  not be rejected  at 5%.  Thus,
we will henceforth  refer mostly  to the estimates  in Table 2 that cover  a larger time period.
The most striking result of Table 2 is the high significance  and negative sign of the export
restriction dummy (DX) in the output growth equation and its positive effect on the capital growth
equation.  The import restriction  dummy (DM) does not appear to have a significant  effect on output
It is important  to note that the signs of the statistically  significant  coefficients  were not affected
by the exclusion  of the observations.16
growth or capital accumulation.  The coefficient  of DM was never significant  including  in specifications
(not reported in Table 2) where the variable  a was excluded. That is, countries  that have high direct
restrictions  on exports have experienced  a slower  growth in total factor productivity  but a faster rate of
expansion  of physical  capital than countries  that have not imposed  important  restrictions  to exports. At
the same time whether a country restricts imports  or not does not seem to cause any significant  effect
either on total factor productivity  or capital  accumulation." 0
Another important  result is the highly significant  negative effect of the variability  of the real
exchange  rate on productivity  growth.  Surprisingly,  the variability  of the real exchange rate does not
exert any direct significant  effect on capital accumulation. However,  given that capital growth is also
affected  by output growth, there is an indirect negative  effect of exchange rate variability  on capital
accumulation  as well."  A fourth important  result from Table 2 is that, not surprisingly, the stock of
debt exerts a significantly  negative  effect on capital  growth.
Table 4 shows the net effects of the various exogenous  variables on GDP growth and capital
growth obtained  by solving the simultaneous  system comprised  of equations  (5) and (9).  For example,
the effect of debt on capital  growth considers  its direct effect  as well as the indirect  effect due to the fact
that capital growth affects GDP growth which, in turn, has a second round impact  on capital growth.
These  net effects  are calculated  using the estimated  coefficients  reported  in Table 2.  Since  the coefficients
of DM were completely  insignificant  in both equations  we consider  the net effect of import restrictions
as zero.
'°  In fact, the coefficient  of DM reported in Table 1 as well as in several  other estimates  have never
been sign;ficant.
The lack of significance  of the coefficient  of the exchange  rate variability  in the 1979-83  sample
period (Table 2) is due to the insufficient  number of observations  available to calculate the
coefficient  of variability  of the exchange  rate when it is measured  using annual  data.  When  we
used quarterly data to calculate  REVAR  for 1979-83,  the coefficient  became  again negative  and
significant  in the GDP growth equation  while still insignificant  in the capital  growth equation.17
To judge the quantitative  importance  of the export  restrictions  effect one should  note that the per
capita  GDP growth is expressed in coefficient  form (i.e., 3% is 0.03).  Hence, high export restrictions
have caused a net reduction in growth of about  0.4 percentage  point per annum to countries that have
imposed  them.  This is certainly an important  loss that has occurred despite  the fact that, according  to
the statistical  analysis, the rate of capital growth has been accelerated  by 3 percentage  points in these
countries. The positive  effect of export  restrictions  on capital  growth is somehow  surprising. A possible
explanation  is that production  of exportables  in LDCs tends to be less capital intensive  than other sectors
and, hence, that a relative acceleration  of growth  in the production  of exportables  vis-a-vis  non-tradables
and importables  decreases investments  in physical  capital.
The net effect of exchange rate variability is also negative  for both GDP growth and capital
accumulation. According  to the estimates,  a  10% increase in the degree of exchange rate instability
would cause approximately  a 0.7% deceleration  in output growth and a 0.2% reduction in the rate of
capital accumulation. This result may be considered  to be consistent  with models that acknowledge
exit/entry  costs in investment  determination  (Dixit, 1987  and Rodrik, 1988). In these  models  uncertainty
is a key factor explaining  investments. However, the empirical  analysis  shows that the mechanism  by
which  capital  accumulation  is negatively  affected  is the deceleration  on output  growth caused  by instability
rather than by direct effects. Economic  instability  decreases  productivity  growth which, in turn, causes
a fall in output growth and thus on capital  accumulation.
The net effect of foreign  debt is particularly  detrimental  for capital  accumulation  while  the effect
on output  growth is substantially  less negative. A 10%  increase  in the stock of debt causes  a deceleration
in capital growth of almost 1.5% and a reduction in output growth of the order of 0.4%.  In order to
shed some light on the mechanisms  by which foreign  debt affects  capital  accumulation  we disaggregated
capital growth into growth of private and public capital for a subset of countries  for which these data
were available (23 countries). We estimated  private capital growth as a function  of the same variables18
that we used to explain aggre,ate capital  growth  plus the rate of growth  of public  capital. Public capital
growth, in turn, was explained  by GDP growth and Debt/GDP.  'Ve used an instrumental  variables
technique  to account for the endogeneity  of GDP growth. Table 5 shows the estimated  coefficients  for
the two capital growth equations.
The major findings  in Table 5 are three:  (i) Private capital  accumulation  is much  more affected
by GDP growth than public capital  growth. This, of course, is not surprising  but confirms  that private
investrmlent  is much more procyclical than public investment  although both suffer in periods of slow
growth; (ii) private capital  growth tends to be negatively  affected  by public capital  growth indicating  a
degree of crowding-out;  (iii) Real exchange rate instability  exerts no direct effect on private capital
growth as well.  As in the case of aggregate  capital accumulation,  the negative  effect of exchange  rate
stability  on private capital  accumulation  takes  place entirely  through the output  effect; (iv)  The detrimentai
effect of foreign debt on capital accumulation  appears  to be mostly  concentrated  on the growth of public
capital and not so much on private capital accumulation. That is the debtors' hangover  effect does not
appear to apply to private investment  and its negative  effect on public capital accumulation  is probably
related  to the necessity  of devoting  a greater proportion  of public revenues  to servicing  the debt with the
corresponding  reduction  of public investments.' 2
V.  A Suggested  Intermretation  of the Results
In this section  we present  some possible  hypotheses  that would  help  to interpret  the results. Here
we try to explain the direction  of the partial effects in Table 2 rather than the net effects presented in
Table 4.
12  An important  proportion  of the foreign debt in LDCs is public sector debt.19
The fact that the effects of direct export restrictions and import restrictions are gualitatively
different is consistent  with the hypothesis  that the Lerner's symmetry  condition  does not hold except in
the very long-run. As long as there exist  persistent  current account  imbalances,  as has been  the case with
most countries in our sample, there is no reason to expect that output and capital accumulation  will be
equally affected  by export  and import  restrictions. The results are consistent  with the idea that there exist
positive  externalities  associated  with exports and that direct export promotion  measures  tend to be more
effective  in generating  export growth than the removal  of import restvictions.
Why is it that decreasing  import  restrictions  does not cause  the same effects  as decreasing  export
restrictions? A possible explanation  could be that (if the Terner's  symmetry  condition  does not hold)
lowering  import  restrictions  has a more  indirect  effect  on exports  mostly  because  lower import  restrictions
cause an expansion  of the non-tradable  sector  which, in turn, can compete  with the exportable  sector  for
resources. Also the existence  of unemployment  can greatly reduce  the effectiveness  of reducing  import
restriction  on exports vis-a-vis  export  promotion  measures. A vital general  equilibrium  linkage,  the wage
effect, between  the import substitution  and the export sector can be considerably  weakened  when the
existence  of unei ?loyment  make that the two sectors do not actually  compete  in the labor market.
The positive effect of export promotior,  on productivity  growth may be associated  with export
externalities. To maintain a steady export expansion  it is necessary to allocate a greater volume of
resources to research and development  to create and especially  adopt  new technologies.' 3 This, in turn,
causes a faster growth in total factor productivity. Productiorn  of exportables  in LDCs is more intensive
in research and development  and less intensive  in physical  capital  than the import substitution  and non-
tradable sectors. Thus, countries  that have high export  restrictions  tend to reallocate  capital  away from
13  Although  LDCs do not create  in a considerable  manner "new"  technologies,  the rapid adaptation
and dissemination  of foreign technologies  to the indigenous  conditions  is an essential condition
for fast productivity  growth.  Investments  in research and development  are possibly the most
important  factor explaining  this process.20
research and development  activities toward physical capital accumulation. This explains the negative
effect on total factor productivity  growth and the positive (partial)  direct effect on capital accumulation
of export restrictions. However, the total effect on physical  capital accumulation  of export restrictions
is still negative because the deceleration of output growth that they cause has a sufficiently large
detrimental  effect on physical  capital accumulation  to offset the partial positive  effect.
The negative effect of macroeconomic  instability  on productivity  growth is also likely to be
caused  by a reallocation  of resources  away from research and development  possibly associated  with an
increase of  the share of physical capital investments in total investment and a  reduction in total
investments. Investments  in research  and development  are inherently  more long-run  and risky in nature
than investments  in physical  capital. Therefore, economic  instability  is likely to cause a much greater
reduction in research and development  than in physical  capital expansion. This would explain why the
direct effect of real exchange  rate instability  is negative  and significant  on GDP growth equation  but not
significant  in the physical capital  growth equation.
VI.  Summar  and Conclusions
This paper has provided  further evidence  on the role of trade/macro  policy regimes  on economic
growth  and, to the best o1  our knowledge,  for the first time has econometrically  analyzed  the relationship
between trade regime and capital accumulation. The econometric  analysis of economic  growth has
considered  a number  of important  aspects  mostly ignored  by previous studies. In the first place, the role
of the trade regime has been analyzed  using disaggregated  components  of trade policies rather than a
single indicator of "trade liberalization." The disaggregation  between export incentives  and import
protection  has been shown to be theoretically  consistent  if one recognizes  that trade policies (combined21
with  suitable  macroeconomic policies)  can  independently affect  the  real  incentives  of
importables/exportables  and non-tradables.
In the second place, we have shown that the distinction between ex-ante sustainable and
unsustainable  strategies has important  implications  for the analysis of the role of trade/macro policy
strategies  for economic  development. In particular, by explicitly  considering  indicators  of real exchange
rate instability  in conjunction  with direct export incentives  and direct protection  for import substitution
we have been able to obtain an idea of the importance  of unsustainable  trade/macro  policies as a factor
retarding growth.
In the third place, the empirical  analysis  has allowed  for the simultaneous  determination  of output
growth and capital accumulation. This is in contrast with most previous studies on growth that have
typically assumed a one way causality  from capital accumulation  to output growth.  The joint analysis
of output growth  and capital  accumulation  has allowed  us to consider  the effects  of various policy-related
variables  considering  both direct mechanisms  (productivity  growth)  and indirect  mechanisms  via changes
in capital growth.
The empirical results permit us to obtain some important  implications: (i) Export promotion
policies  and not import  liberalization  have  generated  faster  growth; (ii)  Unsustainable  ex-ante  trade/macro
regimes have had a significant  detrimental  effect on economic  growth; (iii) Economic  instability  and
foreign debt are key determinant of capital growth; (iv) Contrary to the conventional  belief, capital
accumulation  appears  to be stimulated  by direct export restrictions  and does not seem to be affected  by
economic  instability.22
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Table 1:  TRADE/MACRO  POLICY  STRATEGIES
Direct  Direct  Real exchange
expoyt  import  Current  rate
oromotion  strcticns  Account  Variability
1.  Anti-non-tradables/sustainable  (+)  (+)  (+)  low
2.  Import substitution/sustainable  (-) (0)  (+)  0 (+)  low
3.  Export promotion/sustainable  ()  (-0)  0 (+)  low
4.  Import  substitution/unsustainable  (-)  (+)  (-/+)  high
5.  Export promotion/unsustainable  (+)  (-)  (-/+)  high
6.  Anti-tradables/unsustainable  (-)  (-)  (-/+)  high25
Table 2:  TWO STAGE  LEAST  SQUARE  (2SLS)  ESTIMATION  OF THE GDP
GROWTH  AND CAPITAL  GROWTH  EQUATIONS  (1975-85)
Dependent  Constant  CAPG  GDPG  LABG  Debt/  REVAR  DX  DM  R 2
Variable  (10)  (j)  (L)  GDP  (o)
Per capita  0.027  0.275  - 0.232  - -0.061  -0.014  -0.005  0.57
GDP growth
(GDPG)  (2.56)  (4.92)  (0.68)  (-2.54)  (-3.01)  (-0.74)
Per capita  -0.015  - 1.462  - -0.099  0.076  0.044  0.0005  0.62
Capital  stock
growth  (0.31)  (1.73)  (-2.08)  (0.89)  (3.24)  (0.03)
(CAPG)
Note:  t-statistics  are in bracket26
Table 2A:  DEFINMONS OF THE VARIABLES
(1)  REVAR  real exchange  rate variability  as measured  by the coefficient
of variability  (standard  deviation/mean  of the annual  average
values  of the real exchange  rate)
(2)  GDPO  avrae  rato of per capita GDP growth
(3)  DM  a dummy  variable equals to g  if direct import protection
(tariffs/quots)  is Wigh  and zero otherwise
(4)  DX  a  dummy variable that equals to  as  if  dirct_epr
restrictions  are high and zero otherwise.
(5)  CAPO  avage  rate of growth of physical  capital per capita
(6)  LABG  avorage  rae  of growth of the labor force
(7)  Debt  avenge level of total foreign  debt relative  to GDP
GDP27
Table 3:  TWO STAGE LEAST  SQUARE  ESTIMATION  OF THE
MODEL  FOR THE PERIOD  1979-83
Dependent  Constant  CAPG  GDPO  LABO  DdX/  REVAR  DX  DM  R 2
Variable  (1)  (j)  (L)  GDP  (o)
Per capita  0.005  0.232  - 0.703  - 0.009  -0.016  -0.015  0.59
GDP growth
(GDPG)  (0.39)  (3.64)  (1.42)  (0.24)  (-2.62)  (-1.47)
Per capita
capital stock  0.047  0.058  - -0.245  -0.146  0.034  0.057  0.42
growth
(CAPG)  (0.72)  (0.73)  (-2.54)  (-1.01)  (1.13)  (1.83)
Note: t-statistics  are in bracket28
Table 4:  NET EFFECTS OF THE VARIOUS EXOGENOUS VARIABLES ON GDP
GROWTH AND CAPITAL ACCUMULATION (1975-85 SAMPLE)
DX  DM  o  D/GDP
GDP Growth Rate  -0.004  0.00  -0.067  -0.041
Capital Accumulation  0.032  0.00  -0.022  -0.148
Rate29
Table 5:  DETERMINANTS  OF THE GROWTH  RATE OF PRIVATE  AND PUBLIC
CAPITAL  STOCKS: INSTRUMENTAL  VARIABLE  ESTIMATES  USING
POOLED  DATA  FROM PERIODS  1975-80  AND 1981-85
Dependent  Constant  PBCAPG  GDPG  Debt/  REVAR  DX  DM  R2
Variable  (i)  GDP  (o)
Per Capita  -0.09  -0.84  6.51  -0.16  0.25  0.04  0.03  0.30
Growth  of
Private Capital  (-1.25)  (-1.85)  (3.12)  (-1.12)  (0.81)  (0.90)  (0.45)
(PVCAPG)
Per Capita  0.09  --  2.50  -0.23  --  --  0.32
Growth  of  (1.80)  (2.48)  (-2.52)
Public Capital
(PBCAPG)
Note: t-statistics  are in bracket30
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